Exam Preparation – Nietzsche “Good and Evil”.

In my first Davidson post I stated that Foucault and Patocka aren’t in the readers, this is a mistake, they are, I just didn’t see them, what an idiot, right? That being the case I’m going to do some notes on Foucault too, hopefully covering my bases for this exam. I’m going to focus on the study questions given to us in the unit manual as they contain previous years essay questions – one figures these will be the exam questions this year.

Qu 1: Explain the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’

This question is the basis for much of the first essay (“First Essay: Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad.’”) in our reader, where Nietzsche beings with a critique of the “English psychologists” and their pragmatism:

The way they bungled their moral genealogy comes to light at the very beginning, where the task is to investigate the origin of the concept and judgment “good”. “Originally” – so they decree – “one approved unegoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to whom they were done, that is to say, those to whom they were useful; later one forgot how this approval originated and, simply because egoistic actions were always habitually praise as good, one felt them to be good – as if they were something good in themselves.” (Nietzsche, p. 25, On the Genealogy of Morals, 1989)

Nietzsche believes the ‘good’ in pragmatism to be put in the wrong place, it does not arise from those to whom goodness was shown, but rather it was those who called themselves ‘good’ (meaning: the noble, powerful, high-minded etc) who deemed themselves and their actions ‘good. This was done so in contradistinction states Nietzsche to the low (meaning: low-minded, common and plebian) – it was this distance in power that the powerful sought the right to create values as a matter of utility. Nietzsche thinks it is this “pathos of nobility” (p. 26) that allowed the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ to be defined as above and below, that is the low-minded to be lower, hence bad – Nietzsche believes the ability to conceive of language is an expression of power or the rulers. Hence to Nietzsche ‘good’ is “definitely not linked from the first and by necessity to “unegoistic actions, as the superstition of these genealogists would have it.” (p. 26) Nietzsche found that when he looked at the “real etymological significance of the designations for “good”" (p. 27) coined in different languages he found that it always led back to the same “conceptual transformation” (p. 27) of the ‘good’ meaning “noble”, and “aristocratic”. This notion of privilege also always led to the conception of ‘bad’ as “common, “plebian”, or “low” (as he demonstrates in the histories of the Jewish, Roman, German and Celtic traditions pp.29-36).

Juxtaposed to this style or morality Nietzsche talks of “slave morality”, especially ressentiment:

While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” and what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye - this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself – is of the essence of ressentiment. (Nietzsche, p. 36-37, On the Genealogy of Morals, 1989)

Nietzsche compare what each type of morality needs, the slave needs a hostile world, while the noble, privilege. It is here he talks of the Greeks who defined their morality by the “happy” and “unhappy” which was different according to Nietzsche as the well-born thought of themselves happy but did not define their morality in contradistinction to their enemies.

Reference

Nietzsche, F. W. (1989). “First Essay: Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad.’” Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. On the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. Pp. 25, 26, 27, 29-36, 36-37,

Exam Preparation – Patocka: “Personal Spatiality.”

Let us begin with study questions

Qu 1: Can we be indifferent to our own being?/Qu 2: What does Patocka mean when he says that typical human expression is ‘for the sake of which’?

Patocka begins with an analysis of philosophy going back to Aristotle and how the individual, the subject is left out, is not themetized, even when these philosophers got to the question of existence, the third person was how they discussed their ideas – it was Descartes who first made the turn towards the I, with is ego cogito cogitatum. This was not enough for Patocka though, as he states it comes to grief when we look at the situatedness of ourselves in the world. Descaretes tried to go from the first, to third persons, a philosophy of res extensa, a mathematical nature, which leaves no room for “situational concepts or for situatedness generally. ” (p, 172)

We need to delve beneath this layer of the impersonal and bring out the originary personal experience. The experience of the way we live situationally, the way we are as personal beings in space. We cannot rest content with the trivial conception which sees our body in a dualistic perspective – contained in the res extensa as a thing among things and objective processes, with which subjective processes are coordinated as their reflection. Even those need to be objectified in turn, transformed into impersonal entities which we can impersonally coordinate with them. (Patocka, p. 172, Body, Communication, Language, 1996)

We must look at how we are in space, are we in it among other things, and is such a conception possible? Patocka states that the tradition found that knowledge exists in objective relations, – Patocka disagrees stating that such knowledge is only possible if there is a being that is in space differently – not simply another thing next to them in space, it must  exist in it, by relating to itself through things which relate to other things.

That means, a being who can act out its life, comport itself with respect to its life in various ways simply in relating to other things and so finding a place in the world of things. We are not indifferent neighbors of things. Our relations are external, indifferent. Our nonindifference to our own being, that it matters to us, that we are no indifferent to our being – all that is expressed in the typically human expression, for the sake of: we do something for the sake of something. Therein lies the nonindifference of our mode of being. (Patocka, p. 172, Body, Communication, Language, 1996)

To Patocka the for the sake of which entails being integrated in the world, it signifies the means to an particular end, which are provided for us by the things around us – put another way, there is a continuity between such things and the for the sake of which, as Patocka states: “That means that our being among things is not a mere indifferenct being next to, a juxtaposition of things in space.” (p. 173) From here Patocka states we must look to characterize this being, as one that is oriented, or aiming at things, or even “ordered to acting among things, acting and in that action co-acting with others” (p. 173) we become oriented not just with things, but with other persons. This is our original drive which turns back inwards on ourselves in which we see our relations to others – that, Patocka states is our natural reflective tendency of our drive toward things, as beings in space among things – this is part of our nonindifference to things and ourselves. (p. 173)

Qu 3: Explain: ‘Reflection is grounded in the innermost finitude of being human and its relation to truth’.

Patocka states that we have asked about the essential reach of our reflections – our goal to him, was to reach an originary phenomenon, which would allow him to reject all models that objectified human life – this leads us to two types of phenomenology: (1) Husserl and (2) Heidegger. Under Husserl’s conception attempted to show modern Cartesianism, in its most extreme and sophisticated form – the ego cogito which seeks to remain in the personal, or what Husserl calls “transcendental intersubjectivity” was the ground the “phenomenological reduction leads” (p. 174) , under this the world is the basis for communication:

The personal world is not a set of islands amid an impersonal nature, rather impersonal nature becomes a mer objective pole of unified intentionalities of harmoniously living monads that make contact through this objectivity, The access to it is reflection, self-grasping in pure originality and self-certainty.  (Patocka, p. 174, Body, Communication, Language, 1996)

Patocka still sees problems with Husserl here, he admits the theory is attractive in that it opens up perspectives in the subjectivity of lived experience, but the question of “absolute reflection” in which attempts to move our personal, finite lived experience into an “absolute object” – it is this objectivity Paotocka means to deny. He states that Husserl never quite manages to bring the corporeal subject in continuity with absolute reflection and he states further that the ultimate foundation is not personal but rather, subjectivity itself. But what is the ground of absolute reflection? Patocka states there is none, no further theory, and no deeper explanation – absolute reflection then is the foundation of all philosophy the ground to which all else is reduced – this conclusion led to more problems, not solving them.

Is there, need there not be found, a theory of reflection which, without rendering impossible the achievement of truth, of the clairty, of all that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology provided, would yet remain a theory of finite reflection, continuous with the finitude of human life?(Patocka, p. 175, Body, Communication, Language, 1996)

The answer is seems may lie in Heidegger in which he starts from existence – Patocka states that even with Husserl there is still a desire to move to an impersonal foundation an “existence which merely notes itself, which is given to itself purely for observation.” (p. 175)  Patocka states there is an alienation, a distance in observation, of which does not present itself in Heidegger’s theory which states that the world is not an aggregate of entities, but rather a “context belonging to us and our intrinsic structure, to the structure of our being.” (p. 176)  Here Heidegger’s theory does for Patocka what Husserls’ could not- it stresses the finitude within the basic structures of living, the finitude of reflection:

Reflection is grounded in the innermost finitude of being human and in its relation to truth. Those, ultimately are the reasons for reflection. (Patocka, p. 176, Body, Communication, Language, 1996)

For Patocka Heidegger offers greater possibilities than Husserl.

Refernece

Patocka, Jan. “Personal Spatiality, Husserl, Heidegger.” Trans. Erazim Kohak. Body, Communication, Language, World. Ed James Dodd. Chicago; La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1996, 172, 173, 174, 175

Exam Preparation – Foucault “What is Enlightenment?”

Let us look at the study questions for Michel Foucault:

Qu 1: Discuss Foucault’s claim that modern man is compelled ‘ to face the task of producing himself’.

This question comes from a look at Kant, and Foucault pondering what is contained within the concept of ‘modernity’ in which he sees it as an attitude rather than a period in history – in this he means “a mode of connecting to connecting to contemporary reality” (p. 309) it is a way of thinking and behaving. In fact he explains modernity using Baudelaire’s terms who presented them in such a  way as to emphasize the subject:

Modernity is often characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, a vertigo in the face of the passing moment. (Foucault, p. 310, The Foucault Reader 1984)

Foucault states that Baudelaire’s view is of the “heroization” of the moment in modernity, which is ironic in that moderns do not actually treat each passing moment as sacred in order to “maintain or perpetuate it.” (p. 310) The modern man is a spectator, content to build memories of “curiosities” (p. 311) This creates a desire to imagine the modern world otherwise, the modern man is forming a relationship with the present as well as himself:

Modern man, for Baudelaire, is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets, and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. (Foucault, p. 311, The Foucault Reader 1984)

This leads us to our topic question in that this “modernity does not liberate man in his own being”; it compels him to face the task of producing himself” (p. 312) To Baudelaire these aesthetic tastes, the ironic heroization of the present, do not have a place in the body politic or in society as a whole, they are produced in other places, which he calls “art”.

Qu. 2  What is ‘the philosophical ethos of the Enlightenment’?

To Foucault there is a philosophical ethos, which is using as a critique of the Enlightenment:

I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject – is rooted in the Enlightenment. (Foucault, p. 312, The Foucault Reader 1984)

Foucault states that on the other hand he has been discussing another thread, which may help us understand the Enlightenment is “not faithfulness to doctrinal elements” but rather the adoption of another attitude, one of a permanent critique of our “historical era”- he does this both negatively and positively. Negatively Foucault’s ethos is broken up into tow parts, (1): the refusal of what he likes to call ‘the blackmail of the Enlightenment” (p. 312) in which he means that it is a privileged set of political, economic, institutional, social and cultural domains that we rely on and analyze. He thinks that linking the history of liberty and the progress for truth has formed a philosophical problem we need to consider, while also defining for us, a specific type of philosophizing (rationalism). Having said this however Foucault notes that one need not be “for”, or “against” the Enlightenment, he is seeking to follow critique where it leads and not give up to dualistic ideals (in that you must accept  Enlightenment rationalism or find a way around it) – Foucault asks that we simply be aware of the historical determinism of the Enlightenment. This would mean an analysis that would not necessarily follow the rationalism of the Enlightenment, especially in its historical inquiries, which would only be preserved if “what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects” (p. 313)  was found. (2) We must avoid consuing the Enlightenment with Humanism: the Enlightenment was a series of events and complex historical processes found in a certain point of development in Europe – which involved aspects of “social transformation, types of political institution, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological mutations” (p. 313) etc while humanism is quite different, in which it is a theme that have appeared and reappeared on several occasions in Europe tied to value judgements – this has meant a great deal of variety in the values cherished within Humanism (as seen in Christian, Marxist personalism and existentialist Humanism). As such Foucault actually believes Humanism and Enlightenment to be in a state of tension.

Positively Foucault’s ethos is broken up into three parts, (1): he thinks his ethos can be characterized as a “limit-attitude”, but is careful to note that he wants to move beyond the “outside-inside” alternative (that you accept the Enlightenment or not), he wants to to turn critique into a positive, and he does that by focusng on what is given to us as “universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints…” (p. 315) Foucault wants to move the criticism away from the search of formal structures with universal value, such as those given to us by the Enlightenment, instead he wants to do a historical investigation into what has led us to”constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.” (p. 315) This critique is not transcendental, and is not focused on metaphysics, it follows Nietzsche in that it is genealogical in design and archaeological in method. Foucault wishes to turn away from universals, and moral action, to focus instead on instances of discourse that “articulate what we think, say, and do, as so many historical events.{]” (p. 315), this will represent the archaeological sense. Genealogically:

… it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. (Foucault, p. 315-316, The Foucault Reader 1984)

(2) If the historico-critical attitude is to succeed, Foucault thinks it must be an experimental one, in which we open up a realm of historical inquiry and put it to the test of reality, to determine where change is possible, and the form it should take. This means we must turn away from global and radical projects, as these have been, historically, the ones that lead to the most dangerous traditions – what Foucault would prefer are specific transformations in areas that concern our being and thinking, relations to authority and relations between the sexes, the way we view and deal with insanity and illness.

i shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus work as carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings. (Foucault, p. 316, The Foucault Reader 1984)

(3) Upon reflection Foucault asks if this way o thinking wouldn’t simply lead to another set of  privileged structures, to this he says that it is true that we have to give up on a point of view which states we will be able to come to complete, absolute knowledge, and recognize our historical limits. He states however that this does not leave us with “disorder and contingency” but rather that we have to focus on generalities, systematicity, homogeneity and its stakes.

Reference

Foucault, Michel. “What is Enlightenment?” Trans. Catherine Porter. The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New Tork: Pantheon Books, 1984, Pp. 310, 311, 312, 313, 315-316, 316.

Exam Preparation – Kant: “What Is Enlightenment?”

Now that I have briefly looked at Davidson (and Part 2 here), I’m going to do a write up of Kant short essay for my notes in the exam – only so that I may feel some piece of mind in regards to being covered on all philosophers, should an unexpected question pop up. Today I will be focusing on his piece on enlightenment.

Enlightenment is man’s release from his self incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not without direction from another. Sapre aude! “Have courage to use your own reason!” – that is the motto of enlightenment. (Kant, p. 83 What is Enlightenment? (1784) 1997)

Kant thinks that it is laziness and cowardice that so great a portion of mankind remains “under tutelage”, by which he means we use books to understand for us, pastors who are our conscience for us, physicians who dictate our diets etc – because of this we need not think for ourselves, we can simply pay others do to the work for us. Kant thinks that these “guardians” have made us timid and afraid to work under our own tutelage, which he understands would be difficult, a throwing off such tutelage would leave you without a safety net, left to fend based on your own “natural gifts” (p. 84). Kant thinks that the public can only enlighten itself, if freedom is granted, and even then it would be a slow process, due to the reform in thinking that would need to take place in which new prejudices would replace old ones. What does Kant mean by “freedom” though?

For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the most harmless among all the things to which this term can properly be applied. It is the freedom to make public use of one’s reason at every point. (Kant, p. 84 What is Enlightenment? (1784) 1997)

The guardians of our lives though, halt us from dissent, in that they tell us not to argue (Kant suggests we think of tax collectors asking you to pay, the cleric asking you to believe etc) – to Kant this is a restriction on freedom. The private use of reason Kant states is very often narrowly restricted without hindering the progress of enlightenment, but what is private and public use of reason?

By the public use of one’s reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office in which is entrusted to him. (Kant, p. 85 What is Enlightenment? (1784) 1997)

Kant concedes that there are many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community which require “a certain mechanism through which some members of the community must passively conduct themselves with artificial unanimity, so that the government may direct them to public ends…” (p. 85). This member of the commonalty must obey, although she may address the public.  Here Kant is talking about, for example,  the officer who must obey her chain of command, but as a “scholar” she may lay her concerns on her service before the public for judgement. Or of the priest who must convey the tenets and practices of his church to his flock, for he has accepted those tenets to work in such a position, but as a scholar he is free, and Kant would say compelled, to communicate to the public his own thoughts and critiques of the practices and tenets of his position.

The use, therefore, which an appointed teacher makes of his reason before his congregation is merely private, because this congregation is only a domestic one (even if it be large in gathering); with respect to it, as a priest, he is not free, nor can he be free, because he carries out the orders of another. But as a scholar, whose writings speak to his public, the world, the clergyman in the public use of his reason enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person. (Kant, p. 86 What is Enlightenment? (1784) 1997)

Because of this Kant states that we do not yet live in an enlightened age, but rather an “age of enlightenment” (p. 88). As he states, and as we’ve seen, much still halts us from expressing our private reason free from “outside direction” – but we do, on the otherhand, have greater autonomy to share our private reason, “the obstacles to general enlightenment or the release form self-imposed tutelage are gradually being reduced.” (p. 88)

Reference

Kant, I. (1784) 1997. “What is Enlightenment?” Trans. Lewis White Beck. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment? Second, revised ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Pp. 83, 84, 85, 86, 88.

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Exam Preparation – Davidson: “What Metaphors Mean” – Part 2.

Here is Part 1.

Davidson moves to a similar critique to Wittgenstein’s ostensive (and part 2) teaching of words argument in which he talks of ostensive teaching – that of teaching a Saturnian what the word “floor” means. Upon transporting you to his planet you refer to the pale blue dot known as earth as “floor” using metaphorical language (similar to Dante when he calls Earth ” the small round floor that makes us passionate” (p. 35)) Under the theory under consideration would it matter at all to the Saturnian which way he took it? Davidson says not, as in this theory “floor” would take on a new meaning  in a “metaphorical context”. To Davidson metaphor can be either (1) something that draws our attention to language, or (2) to what language is about – he thinks it is the latter. This can be seen he says when we view dead metaphors as in the case of the mouths of rivers and bottles – once upon a time they did not literally have mouths: but now in common usage the ambiguity of the word “mouths”in the senses of rivers, bottles and animal apertures (or “if we think there is a single wide field application that embraces both” (p. 35)) is irrelevant. What is relevant to Donaldson is that when we apply “mouth” metaphorically to bottles the use points the hearer to a likeness between bottle and animal openings:

Once one has the present use of the word, with the literal application to bottles, there is nothing left to notice. There is no similarity to seek because it consists simply in being referred to by the same word. (Davidson, p. 35, On Metaphor, 1978)

To Davidson if there was a second meaning such as that of ambiguity there might be opportunity to specify the special meaning of a word in a metaphorical context by waiting until the metaphor dies, as he states: “The figurative meaning of the living metaphor should be immortalized in the literal meaning of the dead.” (p. 36) He rejects this idea however, and now he turns to how it might be saved in another fashion: by stating that “the figurative meaning of a metaphor is the literal meaning of the corresponding simile.” (p. 36) for example: “Thus “Christ was a chronometer” in its figurative sense is synonymous with “Christ was like a chronometer”.” (p. 36) Davidson states there is difficulty in putting a metaphor so closely with a simile as it can be sometimes difficult to locate the corresponding simile to go with the metaphor – this theory however should not be confused with the common theory that metaphor is an “elliptical simile” (p. 36) as:

This theory makes no distinction in meaning between a metaphor and some related simile and does not provide any ground for speaking of figurative, metaphorical or special meanings. It is a theory that wins hands down as far as simplicity is concerned, but it also seems too simple to work. (Davidson, p. 35, On Metaphor, 1978)

Davidson states that if we make the literal meaning of the metaphor the literal meaning of the simile we deny access to the meaning we originally took from the literal meaning of the metaphor, whatever else might need to be added to a non literal meaning, we agreed from the start that this meaning was essential.  Davidson states that this theory has a fatal flaw, it makes the hidden meaning found in a simple sense – by looking at the literal meaning of “what is usually a painfully trivial simile.” (p.  37) For example in the earth is like a floor simile to our “the small round floor that makes us passionate” metaphor, this is trivial because everything is like everything, and in endless ways, according to Davidson – if metaphors are difficult because they are impossible to paraphrase but this theory makes interpretation and paraphrase “are ready to the most callow.” (p. 37) Davidson also states that the comparison to simile sells the metaphor short, in that simile says there is a likeness and we are left to pick out the common features, but metaphor, if we accept it, are led to seek out common features:

Just because a simile wears a declaration of similitude on its sleeve, it is, I think, far less plausible than in thew case of metaphor to maintain that there is a hidden second meaning. (Davidson, p. 38, On Metaphor, 1978)

It is here that Davidson reiterates his argument thus far, and elaborates a little more on it:

The argument so far has led to the conclusion that as much of metaphor as can be explained in terms of meaning may, and indeed must, be explained by appeal to the literal meanings of words. A consequence is that the sentences in which metaphors occur are true or false in a normal, or literal way, for if the words in them don’t have special meaning, sentences don’t have special truth.  This is not to deny that there is metaphorical truth, only to deny it of sentences. (Davidson, p. 39, On Metaphor, 1978)

To Davidson metaphors lead us to notice what might otherwise not be, he does not feel that these “visions, thoughts, and feelings” (p. 39) have merit, or that they are true or false. Davidson states that there is a semantic difference between metaphors and similes in that metaphors tend to be (patently) false and similes tend to be (trivially) true. This falsity in metaphor is what leads us to search out its hidden implication , and shows us that it is in fact a metaphor which we must search to understand.

Davidson states that no “theory of metaphorical meaning  or metaphorical truth can help explain how metaphor works.” (p. 41) As we stated earlier what distinguishes metaphor is it use, not its meaning – moreover this special use is not to say something special as metaphor shows only what is on its face “usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth” (p. 41) which needs no paraphrase as it is given in the literal meaning of the words. To Davidson the theories we have been discussing mistake their goal, they try to tell us a method for deciphering an encoded content within the metaphor, but they actually tell us something about the effects of metaphor. There is for Davidson, a simple way out of this dilemma,  we drop the idea that metaphors carry a meaning or content other than its literal meaning. Davidson does not deny that metaphor has effects on us, he quarrels with how they do it, he denies that they have “special cognitive content” (p. 44) metaphor can make us appreciate a fact (much like a bump on the head, joke or dream can), “but not by standing for or expressing the fact.” (p. 44)

Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight. Since in most cases what the metaphor prompts or inspires is not entirely, or even at all, recognition of some truth or fact, the attempts to give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is simply misguided. (Davidson, p. 45, On Metaphor, 1978)

Reference

Davidson, D. (1978). “What Metaphors Mean.” On Metaphor. Ed Sheldon Sacks. Chicago: Chicago U P. Pp. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 45.

Exam Preparation – Davidson: “What Metaphors Mean” – Part 1.

So, it’s exam preparation time, and in doing so I’m looking over previous exams given to us by the university – one parameter is that we are not allowed to write on authors we have before, since I have written on Frege, Heidegger, Husserl and Wittgenstein. This leaves me with only a few authors: Kant, Davidson, Foucault, Nietzsche, Patocka – in the example exams we’re given Davidson, Kant and Nietzsche are the only authors offered that I haven’t written on. Moreover the other authors (Patocka, Foucault) aren’t featured in the unit reader, hence we can reasonably assume they won’t be in the exam. This leaves me with Kant, Davidson and Nietzsche. I will be focusing on Davidson and Nietzsche – in Davidson’s case the example question given to us is the thesis question of Davidson’s main article, this seems a great place to start in my notes and preparation. Finally we are allowed to take in an A4 piece of paper with notes, no specific restrictions were given on the margin or font size, so I’m filling the page up with wide margins and small font.

The piece I will be focusing on today is from Davidson’s 1978 work On Metaphor, specifically the chapter entitled “What Metaphors Mean”. David begins by stating that:

Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person: and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules. (Davidson, p. 29, On Metaphor, 1978)

Davidson outlines his thesis in that to him metaphors do not use any semantic resources beyond those in which the ordinary depends, and that there are no instruction for devising or determining what a metaphor “means” – a metaphor requires artistic taste and relies on that artistic taste for its success. Davidson states that the goal of his paper is

… concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation mean, and nothing more. (Davidson, p. 29-30, On Metaphor, 1978)

This is the example question given to us for our exam prep – in that we are asked to explain Davidson’s justification for this claim.

Davidson admits that his thesis is contentious, it flies in the face of contemporary views, hence most of his argument is a critical look at others – he believes that once he clears away the confusion, we can see metaphor for the interesting phenomena that it is. The central mistake he sees is the idea that metaphor has an addition to its literal meaning or sense- that of another sense or meaning.

Davidson critiques the idea of metaphor being a vehicle for the conveying of ideas: this is why metaphors cannot be paraphrased – for when we paraphrase we attempt to phrase another way. This is not because metaphors say something “too novel” for paraphrase, but rather, according to Davidson there is nothing there to paraphrase - it is also not to deny that metaphors express a point only that that point cannot be brought out with further words. In the past Davidson states others who have agreed with him that metaphors do not contain additional cognitive content beyond the literal have attempted to show that metaphor is “confusing, merely emotive, unsuited to serious scientific or philosophical discourse(.)” (p. 31) but this is not his view for he considers metaphor to be a legitimate device in science, law,  philosophy and literature – it is also affective in many forms of interaction such as praise, prayer, abuse, description and prescription according to Davidson.  He states his disagreements with these theories pertains to the explanation of how metaphor works, primarily relying on the distinction between “what words mean and what they are used to do.” (p. 31)

I think metaphor belongs elusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings ot the sentences they comprise. (Davidson, p. 31, On Metaphor, 1978)

To be able to explain what metaphorical truth or meaning is, we first need to understand a metaphor – they make us seek out likeness between things.  In the case of similarity Davidson explains that this is natural because it depends on “groupings established by the ordinary meaning of words” (p. 31) which he deems to be natural and unsurprising in that “familiar groupings of objects are tied to usual meanings and usual words.” (p. 32) . This familiar association leads us to conclude states Davidson that there must be some unusual or metaphorical meanings that can be used to explain the similarities metaphor suggests. What this means is that within metaphor words take on new, or extended meanings – but Davidson does not think this theory is complete, it evaporates all meaning from the metaphor. The example hes uses is of “the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters” we would seem to need to regard “face” with extended meaning – this would mean that “face” would apply to ordinary faces and waters in addition. The problem is if we say that in this context face applies to water then waters really do have faces and all sense of metaphor disintegrates – there wold be no difference between metaphor and the introduction of a new word into our vocabulary. To Davidson any account of metaphor must allow for the primary or original meanings to “remain active in their metaphorical setting.” (p. 32)

Another theory Davidson looks at is that perhaps metaphor creates an uncertainty in which words take on a new or an original meaning and the strength of the metaphor relies on this as we waver between the different meanings. This he rejects too, as the supposed ambiguity can be explained by the fact that in “ordinary contexts it means one thing and in the metaphorical context it means something else; but in the metaphorical context we do not necessarily hesitate over its meaning.” (p. 33) The only hesitation that does come is when we need to decide which metaphorical context we are going to accept, not by the fact that we are dealing with a metaphor itself. Davidson begs we be careful of the use of pun in this context too, for sometimes a word will take on two meanings, but it is not the same device as a metaphor: in metaphor whatever meanings we give to words they keep through all correct readings of it, there is no need to reiterate.
Another extension from the two meanings idea is that of a literal and figurative one in which Davidson asks us to imagine that the literal meaning is latent in the sense of something we are aware of while the figurative meaning is of direct interest – Davidson states there must be a rule connecting the two otherwise the theory lapses into ambiguity theory.

The rule, at least for many typical cases of metaphor, says that in its metaphorical role the word applies to everything that it applies to in its literal role, and then some. (Davidson, p. 34, On Metaphor, 1978)

Frege had a very similar rule, that Davidson states as follows:

… the meaning of the word in the special contexts makes the reference in those contexts to be identical with the meaning in ordinary contexts. (Davidson, p. 34, On Metaphor, 1978)

This might be enough for Part one right now.

Reference

Davidson, D. (1978). “What Metaphors Mean.” On Metaphor. Ed Sheldon Sacks. Chicago: Chicago U P. Pp. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 .

Notes on Wittgenstein: “The Private Language Argument”.

In our last series on Wittgenstein we focused on his critique of the ostensive teaching of words, in today’s discussion we will be looking at his critique of the private language argument. Let us allow him to state it for us:

But one could also imagine a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? (Wittgenstein, p. 88, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

Specifically Wittgenstein means:

The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; this immediate private sensation. So another person cannot understand the language. (Wittgenstein, p. 88, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

To discuss this argument, to see if it works,  Wittgenstein asks us how words refer to sensations, or rather how do we learn about the meaning of names of sensations? One possibility is that words are connected to the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation used in their place.” (p. 89)  As in instinctual expressions of pain, presented as pain behavior (crying) – we are then taught other pain behavior by parents and such (pain-language). We need to ask in what way sensations are private? Wittgenstein states that only he can know if he is in pain, while others can only surmise – but of course this is not so in any meaningful sense. To say that others “know” when you are in pain happens all the time (as in your expressions of pain-behavior), though they don’t know it with the same certainty you do – but can it be said you know you are in pain? Or that, simply, you are in pain.  He states that others do not come to learn of your sensations only from behavior just as you cannot, you have them.

From here Wittgenstein asks about inner experiences, which only he can understand – how would he use words to express such? He asks, how we normally do? If his words for sensations are tied up with his natural expressions of sensation, but if this is the case his language is not private, for someone else could understand it. He asks from here, what would it be like for humans showed no pain-behavior? Teaching pain-behavior would then be impossible. Wittgenstein asks us though, what if a child could invent some pain-behavior? Would she be able to convey it to others? Wittgenstein thinks not, the child would not be able to make herself understood – for an entire series of settings in the language would need to be presupposed in order to be understood. (p. 92)

Wittgenstein states that even the ground from which to begin a private language is flawed, for example he uses the case of someone naming a sensation “S”, but even this is troublesome, as the word “sensation” is part of a common language, not one intelligible to the user alone:

So the use of this word stands in need of justification which everybody understands. – And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S”, he has something – and that is all that can be said. “Has” and “something” also belong to our common language. – So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. – But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game… (Wittgenstein, p. 93, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

The justification for a sound or a word in a private language needs something  independent, as this is the very nature of justification – to say simply that you can look up the meaning of your language in your mind means you are relying on subjective justification is not reliable (how can we be sure you have the right sound associated with the right memory?). As Wittgenstein states:

Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of experiment. (Wittgenstein, p. 94, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

Wittgenstein is not doubting that you have private experiences only that they mean very little to the outside world:

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person posses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would this be possible – though unverifiable…(Wittgenstein, p. 95, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

To clarify, Wittgenstein isn’t saying that the sensation of pain is nothing, but he isn’t saying either that it is something, his conclusion is that a nothing would serve as well as something for which nothing can be said about it, this is a grammatical conclusion.

Reference

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1963). “Selection. I” Trans, G. E. M. Anscombe. Philosophical Investigations. Second Ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. 88, 93, 94, 95,

Notes On Wittgenstein: “Ostensive Teaching Of Words” & “Picture Meaning Of Words” – Part 2.

We will now continue our discussion on Wittgenstein – in our last post we just touched on his concept of language games (for our other study notes blogs see here, here, here, here, here, here), he continues that concept, when he states:

One thinks that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, moods, to numbers, etc. To repeat – naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of the word. But what is it a preparation for? (Wittgenstein, p. 88, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

We see that to Wittgenstein the ostensive teaching of words, that is attaching a label to something, or directing someone to an object is not sufficient to convey the full meaning of the text to someone, hence why Wittgenstein states that naming something is preparatory. Wittgenstein has been showing us how specific and different language-games play out to demonstrate his point, which we have more or less skipped over here (it is far too nuanced for our purposes), but briefly, to Wittgenstein the ostensive teaching of words, is a language-game, one a child learns, and propagates. Ostensive teaching of words runs into difficulties when we try to ascribe numbers to proper names, and attempt to point to them, for example as when we point to two nuts and say “that is two”, one must know what “two” is to know that it stands for the two nuts, hence they must require an understanding of the language used prior to ostensive teaching (it is similar when we use the point to things as say “this”, or “that”). To Wittgenstein then ” an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.” (Wittgenstein, p. 89, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)  Ostensive teaching can be useful to explain meaning or use of a word once we have a prior understanding of language.

Here Wittgenstein states the objection of an interlocutor for which he plays the part of, they object that it is in fact not true that we must already master language in order to understand ostensive definition- all you need to know (or guess) what the person is pointing to, for example “the shape of an object”, or “to its color”, or “its number” (p. 90). Wittgenstein asks though, what does pointing to the above consist in? We learn these things differently, we can point to the shape, but not the color of an object, which he calls “characteristic” in that they happen often (not always) when shape or number are ‘meant’.” There is not any one bodily action which we call “pointing to the shape” (as opposed to the color), there is a mental activity that corresponds to the words.

Wittgenstein now offers another critique of the ostensive teaching of words, he states that we could point to the sword “Excalibur”, which consists of parts, and say “Excalibur has a sharp blade”, this makes sense – even if those parts are broken up. However under an ostensive teaching of words, if the sword is broken into pieces and no longer exists as  “Excalibur” – the sentence “Excalibur has a sharp blade” no longer has any meaning. Wittgenstein would argue it still does make sense, hence “there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists.” (p. 91) To clarify Wittgenstein states that we must not confuse the meaning of the name with the bearer of the name – for example, the bearer of the name in our example is Excalibur, to say that Excalibur is destroyed implies the bearer is destroyed, but not the meaning of the word. Wittgenstein would say that meaning of a word can be defined as “is its use in language” (p. 92), whereas the meaning of a name is “sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.” (p. 92)

Again he turns to himself as an interlocutor who questions him:

You take the easy way out! You talk bout all sort so language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence language is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or part so of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language. (Wittgenstein, p. 97, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

Wittgenstein agrees that this is true, he hasn’t produced anything common to language, and that is his point, he is saying that there is not one thing common which makes us use the same word for all, he is talking about relationships that result in language. Much like all the commonalities between different types of games (board-games, Olympic-games etc) we come to see a “complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities in detail.” (Wittgenstein, p. 98, Philosophical Investigations, 1963) To him games “form a family” which is how he uses the word “game”.

Reference

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1963). “Selection. I” Trans, G. E. M. Anscombe. Philosophical Investigations. Second Ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. 88, 89, 91, 97, 98

Notes On Wittgenstein: “Ostensive Teaching Of Words” & “Picture Meaning Of Words” – Part 1.

We now move to Ludwig Wittgenstein in excerpts from his book Philosophical Investigations. He opens with a quote in latin from Augustine, which to him tells us something very specific about language:

In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which it stands. (Wittgenstein, p. 83, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

To Wittgenstein meaning, at least as it is so in the philosophical concept has its place in a “primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.” (p. 83) A child uses such primitive forms of language when learning to talk, and as such Wittgenstein will use the term “ostensive teaching of words” instead of “ostensive definition”. Ostensive teaching of words consists of teachers pointing to objects, directing the child’s attention to them and uttering a word (the example Wittgenstein uses is “slab”) as they point at the shape. The reason Wittgenstein is using the definitions he is is because a child cannot yet use the language for which it is being taught to ask what the name it is being given is.

The ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an association between the word and the thing. But what does this mean? Well, it may mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that a picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the words. But now, if this does happen – is it the purpose of the word? Yes, it may be the purpose. – I can imagine such a use of words. (Wittgenstein, p. 84, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

Wittgenstein asks us, if ostensive teaching has this effect, does this mean you have the complete understanding of the word? He would say you do not. The ostensive teaching helps to bring the above about, but it is not sufficient; only if it is brought together with “a particular training” do we get the complete meaning. After all, given different training the “same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected quite a different understanding.” (p. 84)

It is here that Wittgenstein states his famous phrase; “language-games”, in which he means several different things (1) the process of naming objects and of repeating words after someone (he asks that we think of most of the words in ring-a-ring-a-roses), (2) “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven.” (p. 84) Wittgenstein runs us through several different language games, such as the teaching of numerals, and of “there” and “this”, and it is here that he discusses language as signification:

When we say: “Every word in language signifies something” we have so far said nothing whatever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make. (Wittgenstein, p. 85, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

He states that “to signify” is used straightforwardly in that the object signified is marked with the sign, moreover he thinks that within philosophy it often proves useful to say that “naming something is like attaching a label to something.” (p. 85) We can surmise then from this that Wittgenstein does not think that the ostensive teaching of words, using one might assume the “picture language of meaning” (as proposed in his earlier work, the Tractatus) is not sufficient to convey meaning, hence he is not really critiquing Augustine as such, but rather, himself. Wittgenstein likens language to the suburbs of our town, when he asks if our language is ever complete:

Our language can bee seen as an ancient city; a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. (Wittgenstein, p. 85, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

Wittgenstein moves to a discussion of Frege, who says that every assertion contains an assumption which is the thing being asserted; to Wittgenstein this rests on the possibility in our language of phrasing every statement in the form “It is asserted that such-and-such is the case.” To him the “such-and-such” is not a sentence in our common language, or rather it is not a “move” in the language-game, but to write “It is asserted such-and-such is the case”  the “It is asserted” become superfluous. We could, according to Wittgenstein write every statement in the form of a question followed by a “Yes” (the example he uses “Is it raining? Yes”), but would this show that every statement contained a question? He thinks of course we can use an “assertion sign” or a question mark if we wanted to determine the statement from fiction or supposition. The mistake for Wittgenstein comes when

…one thinks that the assertion consists of two actions, entertaining and asserting (assigning truth-value, or something of the kind), and that in performing these actions we follow the propositional sign roughly as we sing from the musical score. Reading the written sentence loud or soft is indeed comparable with singing from a musical score, but ‘meaning’ (thinking) the sentence that is read is not. (Wittgenstein, p. 87, Philosophical Investigations, 1963)

Wittgenstein asks us how many sentence structures there are? Assertions? Questions? Commands? He states there are countless kinds and countless different uses of symbols, words, sentences and that this is not fixed, or given “once and for all” (p. 87). New types of language and language-games appear while others become obsolete and forgotten (the example he offers are the changes in mathematics, but we can imagine something like a dead metaphor). He notes that here we see that speaking a language is part of an activity, or form of life, inherent to the term language-game used here.

We’re at about 1,000 words, why don’t we leave it there for today, and pick it up from here, next time. I hope you are enjoying this series. I’ve got a few more blogs on Wittgenstein, then Husserl, then I can begin writing my assignment.

Reference

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1963). “Selection. I” Trans, G. E. M. Anscombe. Philosophical Investigations. Second Ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. 83, 84, 85, 87.

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Notes on Husserl: “Appendix V: Objectivity and the World of Experience.”

Today we will be discussing Edmund Husserl’s thought in the “Appendix V: Objectivity and the World of Experience.” from The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970. He begins by discussing “prescientific experiential life” by this he means the process by which we come to  know (objective) things with certainty through sight, touch, feel, sound etc, through the repetition of experience, but Husserl states that what actually occurs is that:

What becomes well known through repeated experience is always still only relatively known in regard to everything known about it, and thus it has in all aspects a peculiar horizon of open unfamiliarity. (Husserl, p. 343, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

Husserl states that when we actually come “nearer” to the thing we experience (or something like it at least), we get to know it more exactly, which he dubs “more exact determination” (p. 343) which is a “continual process of correction” (p. 343) (the example he uses if of seeing something as purely smooth and red, but finding “in truth” it to be a bit rough, and spotted). This relates to the fact that we all have our own experiential representations that we assume with certainty is accurate to everyone else around us too, we tend to assume that:

Everything is valid that is valid for us as actually existing there is always already understood as existing for all, precisely through common experience. (Husserl, p. 343, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

Husserl states that the horizon mentioned above continues on to other objects with horizons that extend beyond what is “coperceived” to the infinity of unknown things (of possible experiential knowledge), which also corresponds to vague causalities. He states that even this manner of being in the world, in suspension, with open, undeterminate horizons does not disturb the everyday world of “normal men” (p. 344) Why is this so? Because in our normal life, we encounter a sphere of normal things which become known through normal (and common) “types of experience”, whatever horizons remain in suspension out of sight of this remain (practically) irrelevant says Husserl. What we are left with is a:

… practically perfect acquaintance with the things as they really are and [as they] can be exhibited [to be] again and again in their true being – in the only truth which normal, practical life knows and needs. (Husserl, p. 344, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

From here Husserl asks then how scientific knowledge is possible, more over how is scientific objectivity possible? He claims that:

A deeper inspection of this knowledge soon gives rise also to the recognition of its relativity to those who experience, individually and together, those who cognitively identify the same things throughout the alteration of wavering, subjective, sensible manners of givenness. But how, from this point, did the idea arise of an absolute, exact determineness of things, and not only those things of the universal, open, infinite world-horizon which can never be traversed by actual experience with its finite progress? (Husserl, p. 345, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

Husserl asks these questions and more, but eventually comes to formulate the problem thus: “the radical problem of the historical possibility of “objective” science” (p. 347) Husserl states we need not simply establish “science’s historical, factual point of origin in terms of place, and actual circumstances”, but rather we must try to understand its original “spiritual motives” which by this Husserl means “its most original meaningfulness” (p. 347) Husserl says we need to look through the origins of a “successful rational objectification within a fundamental stratum of the world”, which he takes to mean the objectification brought forth in mathematical disciplines such as geometry. To Husserl, objectification is a method which is founded in our previously mentioned prescientific data of experience, in which the :

Mathematical method “constructs,” out of intuitive representation, ideal objects and teaches how to deal with them operatively and systematically. It does not produce things out of other things in the manner of handwork; it produces ideas. Ideas arise through peculiar sort of mental accomplishment: idealization. (Husserl, p. 348, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

Firstly idealizing to Husserl accomplishes together with the “exactly identifiable ideas it can produce, as mental structures based on multiplicities of appearance which are suspended in relativity.” (p. 348) Secondly Husserl notes the “operative construction of idea-structures out of pregiven ideas” – it is the inter working of both of these types of idealization that makes up the “objective-scientific mind”. (p. 348) These become “pure-thinking” to Husserl in the sense that they are a “science that idealizes”, and remains purely in the realm of ideas. The leads Husserl to state:

This world [the totality of such objects] is already objective insofar as the knowledge it affords, the ideals formed of it, are absolutely identical for anyone who practices the method, no matter how much his empirically intuitive representation may differ from what serves others in their intuition-based idealization. (Husserl, p. 349, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

From here Husserl questions the a priori nature of the ideal mathematical structure discussed. The a priori is something ideal and general according to Husserl, it is the objectivity of this type of thought that he means to critique, as it is a structure within men, it is we who form it, thus how can it be objective? To get around this problem Husserl states:

It must be shown, then, in deed as something belonging to the individual essence of man and thus to the world, that in mankind this capacity can never cease, can never be completely absent, even if it remains undeveloped for factual reasons. This leads to the most general and deepest problems of reason. (Husserl, p. 350, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970)

To Husserl we are searching for an ultimate truth, in the sciences, in mathematics these “actual or still to be accomplished” branches of a single philosophy, which he calls “theoretical mankind”, and “philosophizing mankind”. One that overcomes finitude, limitedness and relativity, that encompasses the world. To Husserl these questions and goals will guide us toward a new philosophy, which will cause new historical paths and lead to a new method of philosophical work, which one could say we see in his phenomenological project.

Reference

Husserl, E. (1970). “Appendix V: Objectivity and the World of Experience.” Trans. David Carr. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston: Northwest University Press. Pp. 343, 344, 345, 347, 348, 349, 350.

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